Candidate Notes on 04-SIC5

04-SIC5 on May 8, 2004

BIOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS
• Conclusion 48. The assessment in the Oct. 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that, "We judge that all key aspects—research & development, production, and weaponization—of Iraq's offensive biological weapons program are active and that most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War" is not supported by the intelligence provided to the Committee.
• Conclusion 49. The statement in the key judgments of the NIE that "Baghdad has biological weapons" overstated what was known about Iraq's biological weapons holdings. The NIE did not explain the uncertainties underlying this statement.
• Conclusion 50. The statement in the NIE that "Baghdad has mobile transportable facilities for producing bacterial and toxin biological weapons agents," overstated what the intelligence reporting suggested about an Iraqi mobile biological weapons effort and did not accurately convey to readers the uncertainties behind the source reporting.

Conclusion 53. The statement in the key judgments of the NIE that "Chances are even that smallpox is part of Iraq's offensive biological weapons program" is not supported by the intelligence provided to the Committee.

Conclusion 55. The NIE misrepresented the United Nations Special Commission's (UNSCOM) 1999 assessment concerning Iraq's biological research capability.

Conclusion 56. The statement in the key judgments of the NIE that "Baghdad probably has developed genetically engineered biological weapons agents," overstated both the intelligence reporting and analysts assessments of Iraq's development of genetically engineered biological agents.

Conclusion 57. The assessment in the NIE that "Iraq has ... dry biological weapons (BW) agents in its arsenal" is not supported by the intelligence information provided to the Committee.