Candidate Notes on 05-WMD-10

05-WMD-10 on Mar 31, 2005

Libya: Summary & Findings

We compared the Intelligence Community's judgments concerning Libya's weapons programs before Tripoli's decision to open them to international scrutiny with current assessments, thereby providing a rare "before" and "after" study of the U.S. Intelligence Community's performance. We believe that the collection and analytic efforts on Libya's weapons represent, for the most part, an Intelligence Community success story. The Community collected good intelligence on Libya's nuclear and missile programs, and it used this intelligence to enter into well-managed discussions with the Libyans, which eventually led to on-site inspections, and, ultimately, Libyan disavowal of weapons of mass destruction. We found that:
• The Intelligence Community accurately assessed what nuclear equipment Libya possessed, but it was less successful in judging how Libya could exploit the material;
• The Intelligence Community's judgment that Libya possessed chemical weapons

agents and chemical weapons bombs was correct, but Libya's actual chemical weapons stockpile proved to be smaller than estimated;

The Intelligence Community's assessments of Libya's missile programs appear to have been generally accurate, but it is not yet possible to evaluate them fully because of limited Libyan disclosures;

The Intelligence Community's penetration of the A.Q. Khan proliferation network provided invaluable intelligence on Libya's nuclear efforts;

The contribution of technical intelligence to assessments of Libya's chemical, biological, and nuclear programs was limited; it provided some valuable information on Libya's missile programs;

Analysts generally showed a commendable willingness to question and reconsider their assessments in light of new information;

Analysts tracking proliferation program developments sometimes inappropriately equated procurement activity with technical capabilities.